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Because agricultural development is an important basis of economic development, Taiwan
has made a great investment in the agricultural sector since 1945.  Beginning in 1953, the
government carried out its first four-year Economic Development Plan to strengthen agricultural
development and raise national income.  As an indicator of the success of this plan, Taiwan
doubled its agricultural output index from 22.1 in 1952 to 44.5 in 1966; further to 88.4 in 1985
and 104.4 in 1996 (base 1991=100). 
However, as might be expected based on the concept of diminishing returns, the growth rate
of agriculture production has decreased from an average annual growth rate of 4.8 percent
between 1952 and 1980 to 2.1 percent between 1981 and 1995 (Table 1).  In the process of 
Table 1.  Major Agricultural Economic Indicators
Item 1952-1980 1981-1995
- - - - - - Percent - - - - - -
Economic growth rate 11.9 13.1
Increased rate of agricultural production 4.8 2.1




structural change, agriculture has provided labor for nonagricultural development.  Early in this
time period, part of the agricultural surplus was exported to finance imports of much needed
foreign capital goods, helping to alleviate the foreign exchange constraint which hindered
development. 
Agriculture has influenced other aspects of the domestic economy.  For example, the
expanding agricultural sector, accompanied by rising farm family income, represents a major
market for consumer goods produced by domestic manufacturers.  Subsequently, the agricultural
sector shares were adversely affected by import-substitution strategy emphasizing feed grains and
oilseeds, importantly of U.S. origin.  An adequate food supply has been vital for controlling 
inflation, thus helping to effectively mobilize and reallocate domestic resources.  In addition, the
existing agricultural infrastructure was utilized by the nonagricultural sector as a basis for
transportation and public utilities.  In all these ways, the agricultural sector has contributed
decisively to overall economic development.
To foster general economic development, these contributions from the agricultural sector
need to grow constantly.  In order to ensure this continuity of growth in agriculture, certain
policies, including physical investment, technological upgrading, institutional arrangements
concerning the distribution system, and credit rationing are required.  In addition, the agricultural
sector had to adjust constantly to changes in the overall economic environment, which included a
rise of farm wages due to a higher general income level, the gradual exhaustion of surplus
agricultural labor, and changes in composition of the food supply.  These aspects of economic
change represent the effects of the nonagricultural sector on agriculture.  However, the
agricultural sector has paved the way for a more balanced development pattern in terms of stable3
prices, more equitable income distribution, less regional dualism, and a higher degree of social
stability.
China did not solve its food supply problem until 1978.  Although China has invested most of
its manpower and resources to develop agricultural production, it still has not been able to attain
its target of food sufficiency.  Thus, how to feed its population is the major agricultural policy
issue for China.  How persistently China pursues its self-sufficiency policy is an important issue
that contrasts with the Taiwan strategy.  To provide more food, China adopted a market-oriented
reform of its agriculture system.  With the establishment of the objectives of building a market
economic structure and rapid growth of the national economy in 1992, there have been increasing
opportunities for the reform and development of agriculture.  But the difficulties and challenges
have been unprecedented, especially since 1994.  China’s experience resembles the early stages of
agricultural development in any developing economy. 
China and Taiwan have been separated for about 50 years, since 1947.  Taiwan has been
successful in agricultural transformation and adjustment.  Taiwan’s experience of high economic
growth and significant structural change in a relatively short period may indicate that accelerated
growth in the agricultural sector is associated with the development of the nonagricultural sector. 
It also may indicate that rapid economic development is an aid to agricultural development. 
Taiwan's experience may provide useful insight to policy makers of China as they seek to promote
the development of its agriculture.
II. Agricultural Development in Taiwan
In the small farm economy, the role of the government in stimulating development should not
be ignored.  The atomistic agricultural sector requires a tremendous amount of support from the4
public sector because of its inability to manage production and the fixity of resources.  The
following are some of the more important institutional factors that have contributed to the
successful development of agriculture in Taiwan.    
1. Land Reform Program 
In the immediate postwar years, Taiwan’s farm population constituted more than 50 percent
of the total population.  The pressure on land was great and many farmers did not own the small
pieces of land that they cultivated.  They were tenants under the age-old tenure system.  Share-
crop rental rates were at least 50 percent of the crop harvest.  As a result, it was difficult to
motivate farmers to improve farming practices to increase production.  The result was discontent
and unrest in the rural areas.  Land reform was the first measure the Taiwan government took to
remedy this situation and promote rural development.  
Land reform in Taiwan was launched in 1949 and completed in 1953.  It consisted of three
steps:  rent reduction, sale of public lands, and the land-to-the-tiller program.  These steps were
carried out sequentially as a bloodless revolution in which farmland was gradually and peacefully
transferred to the actual tiller.  This program helped the farmers improve their livelihood and
brought about a more stable social order in the villages.
In the first step of the program, emphasis was placed on two aspects:  reduction of rent and
security of tenancy.  Under this measure, the farm rental rate was set at 37.5 percent of the annual
main crop yield, and the lease tenure period was fixed at a minimum of six years -- which could be
extended after expiration.
Successful implementation of the rent reduction program paved the way for the subsequent
introduction of the sale-of-public-lands program, which involved vast areas of public lands on5
which a sizable farm population was working as tenants.  The government thought it was unfair to
ask landlords to sell their holdings to tenants while the government itself held large estates.  To
set an example, the government proceeded to sell public lands to their incumbent tenants. The
price of the public lands offered for sale was fixed at 2.5 times the value of the annual main crop
yield.  This purchase price was to be paid in 20 semi-annual installments over ten years.
Following the sale of public lands, the government started the final step of land reform,
known as the land-to-the-tiller program.  Under this program, each landlord was allowed to keep
three chia (about 2.907 ha) of medium-grade paddy fields or six chia of drylands.  Holdings
exceeding that limit were purchased by the government and resold to tenant farmers who had
been tilling them.  The price of land again was set at 2.5 times the annual main crop yield.  The
landlord was paid 70 percent of the land price with land bonds and 30 percent with shares of
government-owned industries.  This payment arrangement forced the landlords to shift their
investment from land to industry.
The rural land reform program fostered a profit-based market economy.  After the program,
farm families owning all or part of the land they tilled increased from 61 percent to 88 percent. 
Tenant families decreased from 39 percent to 12 percent of the total number of families.  Other
benefits of a social and economic nature can also be observed.  On the economic side, land reform
gave profit incentives to farmers and facilitated the successful implementation of various
agricultural measures.  As a result, great improvements were made in Taiwan's agriculture. 
Farmers worked much harder after reform.  The index of multiple cropping increased from 170 in
1953 to 190 in 1964.  On the social and political side, farmers became better fed and clothed.  
Many of them started to build and repair their houses.  Since land is the major source of farm6
income, land reform also played an important role in the redistribution of income which, in turn,
brought a large measure of social justice to the rural areas.  As a result of land reform, farmers
have shown greater pride of ownership and interest in community activities.  Many have run for
and won local public offices.  With improved social and political status, farmers have acquired a
greater feeling of responsibility and citizenship.
2. Agricultural Trade and Economic Development
The agricultural sector earned a large amount of foreign exchange in the 1950s and 1960s,
thus greatly improving Taiwan's balance of international payments.  Agriculture provided exports
in exchange for the capital goods needed for industrial development.  The increase in agricultural
production made it possible to satisfy domestic food requirements and also left a substantial
surplus for export.  Agricultural products long dominated the island's total exports -- with a share
of about 90 percent in the 1950s (Table 2).  Agriculture still financed a majority of Taiwan's total
imports through the mid-1960s -- a crucial period in which the most serious constraint upon
economic development was the amount of available foreign exchange.
Table 2 indicates that, even though the total value of agricultural exports continued to
increase after 1965, agriculture’s share of exports precipitously decreased to a 1996 low of 4.7
percent due to the rapid expansion of the industrial sector.  In 1996, Japan was by far the most
important export market for Taiwan's agricultural products, accounting for 44.8 percent of total
agricultural exports.  Hong Kong followed with 18.1 percent, and the United States with 9.1
percent.  Agriculture’s share of total imports likewise fell from about 30 percent in the 1950s to
9.8 percent of total imports in 1996.  It will be noted from Table 2 that agricultural imports have 7








- - - - - - - - Million US $ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent - - - - - - - -
1952 114.2 66.5 95.5 32.1
1955 124.4 65.5 92.8 34.5
1960 121.0 75.8 71.0 30.1
1965 286.5 153.8 63.7 27.7
1970 388.1 376.5 26.2 24.7
1975 1,041.7 1,244.7 19.6 20.9
1980 2,251.0 3,088.7 11.4 15.7
1985 2,294.7 3,413.5 7.5 17.0
1990 3,661.4 6,088.3 5.5 11.1
1995 5,638.8 9,763.9 5.1 9.4
1996 5,484.9 9,986.6 4.7 9.8
Source: Basic Agricultural Trade Statistics of Taiwan, 1996.
increased more rapidly than exports and to a level that is about 80 percent higher.  Total
agricultural imports increased very rapidly from US$75.8 million to US$9,986.6 million, a 132-
fold increase in a period of 36 years.  This reflects Taiwan’s increased dependence on the imports
of feed grains and oilseeds and the related change in the diets of Taiwanese people from rice to
pork, chicken, vegetables and fruit.  Taiwan’s policy has recognized that its comparative
advantage lies in meat, fruit and vegetable production.  
  The United States was the main supplier, providing 54.5 percent of Taiwan's total
agricultural imports.  Other sources of agricultural imports were Malaysia, 9.3 percent; Australia,
5.5 percent; Indonesia, 4.5 percent; Thailand, 3.4 percent; and Japan, 2 percent.  The high8
concentration of both exports and imports is in the hands of two countries -- Japan for exports
and the United States for imports.  
3. Changes in Food Consumption Patterns and Food Self-sufficiency
During the past four decades (1956-1995), the population of Taiwan increased at an annual
rate of 2.5 percent, while agricultural production grew at 3.5 percent.  The higher growth in
agricultural production indicates that agriculture in Taiwan has been able to provide enough food
at reasonable prices to meet the rising and changing demand of an increasing population.  Daily
per capita calorie intake increased from 2,262 to 3,103 calories, and protein intake increased from
54 to 98 grams during the same period. 
Table 3 indicates changes in food consumption patterns during the period from 1956 to 1995.
Since 1970, there has been a significant decrease in the per capita consumption of sweet potatoes
and rice, combined with a remarkable increase in the consumption of meat, sugar, vegetables,
fruits and milk.  The change in the food consumption pattern was mainly due to the increase of
per capita income in Taiwan.  The increase in meat and fish consumption has not only provided an
opportunity for the development of poultry, livestock and fishery industries, but also has resulted
in a big increase in feed grain and soybean imports, as analyzed in the previous section.  The
increase in the consumption of vegetables and fruits has provided market incentives for farmers to
change the composition of crop production to more vegetables and fruits.  This change in demand
patterns precipitated adjustments in production patterns which greatly increased the intensity of
agricultural production and the farmers’ incomes. 
Increases in the level of food intake, combined with changes in consumption patterns and
slower growth in agricultural production, have resulted in a decline in the food self-sufficiency9
Table 3.  Per Capita Annual Food Consumption in Taiwan
       Item 1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Polished rice 132.6 137.7 134.5 105.5 65.9 59.1
Sweet potatoes   64.2   65.4   18.4     4.1   2.7   2.5
     Subtotal 196.8 203.1 152.9 109.6 68.6 61.6
Wheat flour   16.6 20.0 25.4 23.6 28.7 31.9
Sugar 9.4 9.4 15.0 24.0 29.8 24.2
Pulses, nuts and seeds 10.9 11.4 18.3 18.8 29.0 31.7
Vegetables 58.4 61.1 84.8 129.6 93.3 101.9
Fruits 14.5 22.1 45.8 70.2 131.5 137.4
Meat 17.0 16.2 25.3 39.6 62.9 76.1
Eggs 1.6 1.6 4.1 8.0 12.1 16.2
Fish 18.8 21.7 34.2 38.7 47.5 38.4
Milk 6.0 3.2 11.0 27.6 43.0 58.8
Oils and fats 3.7 4.7 7.7 10.8 23.3 26.3
Source: Basic Agricultural Statistics, Council of Agriculture, 1996.
ratio (Table 4).  Prior to 1960, domestic food production was able to meet domestic food
requirements and the food self-sufficiency rate was about 100 percent (on a value basis).  Since 
then, the self-sufficiency rate has persistently declined to 85 percent in 1995.  This means that 15
percent of domestic requirements had to be met with imports.  Taiwan has had to rely heavily on 
imports to satisfy the domestic demand for wheat, corn, soybeans, other feed grains, and dairy
products.
Although per capita consumption of cereals declined over the last 20 years, consumption of
cereals used as animal feed has increased substantially, rising from 8 kg in 1952 to more than 372
kg in 1995.10
Table 4.  Food Self-Sufficiency Rate (Percent) in Taiwan, 1950-1995
       1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
-------------------- Percent --------------------
Total food 105 99 97 92 88 85
Cereals 103 93 82 66 58 55
Rice 110 102 104 113 99 103
Others 27 21 6 3 0 0
Starchy food 100 100 101 102 100 100
Sugar 826 739 280 200 93 84
Pulses, nuts and seeds 60 66 31 16 11 15
Vegetables 100 100 160 147 117 96
Fruits 106 127 148 110 94 87
Meat 100 102 102 99 105 110
Eggs 100 100 101 101 100 100
Fish 84 100 120 123 118 114
Milk 4 13 11 11 22 25
4. Infrastructure and Agricultural Production 
1) Irrigation 
Since paddy rice is the major food crop, irrigation is an indispensable factor of
production.  Without a reliable water supply, the full potential of high-yielding varieties
and chemical fertilizers could not be realized.  In Taiwan, the yield of the first rice crop is
always higher than the second.  One of the reasons is that the first crop is largely irrigated
while the second crop, to some extent, depends on rainfall, which is generally plentiful
but varies greatly from year to year.  A regression analysis indicates a very high11
correlation between area irrigated and yield per hectare (Rada & Lee, 1963).  Similar
correlation has also been observed in Thailand and the Philippines. 
Building a large irrigation network has been one of Taiwan’s major objectives.  The
Taiwan irrigation system consists of 1,644 structures for diverting water from the rivers
and 30,000 kilometers of canals, laterals and ditches.  With this system, over 60 percent
of Taiwan's farmland is irrigated.  Irrigation projects in Taiwan are financed with
government subsidies, long-term and low interest loans, and assessments collected from
the farmers.  Irrigation associations have responsibility for the management of irrigation
facilities.  
2) Rural Roads
Roads are of prime importance to rural development because they reduce the costs of
transporting and marketing farm products.  Productive rural areas require a good
network of roads both within the area and to market centers.  The development of a rural
area requires three kinds of roads:  farm roads, area roads, and roads leading to major
highways or railway stations.  In Taiwan, the construction of farm roads is coordinated
with irrigation and land consolidation programs.  This has facilitated the movement of
farm machinery and vehicles.  Area roads and roads leading to the highways are usually
county roads.  Although these roads are not wide, most of them are paved.  Except for
the mountain areas, it is rare in Taiwan to see a village without paved roads.
To summarize, Taiwan's agricultural development efforts may be divided into three steps:
first, to give farmers a market incentive to produce more; second, to provide them with modern
farm inputs; and third, to encourage them to participate in business and community activities12
which are of importance to their livelihood.  These factors are not the only ones that have helped
Taiwan's agricultural development.  They are all an integral part of Taiwan's overall development
program.  Some of them are closely related and dependent upon one another and, therefore, they
need to be well coordinated. 
5. Transformation to an Industrialized Economy
Taiwan's modern economic development began in 1952.  By then, economic output had
recovered to pre-war levels in most sectors, even surpassing previous levels in some basic
commodities such as rice, sweet potatoes and cotton fabrics.  Inflation decreased from the
hyperinflation of the late 1940s to a more reasonable 18 percent for consumer products.  Former
Japanese enterprises had been rehabilitated and, in most sectors, reached or surpassed pre-war
levels.  Government policy makers looked forward to further industrial development, and 1953
marked the implementation of the first Four-Year Economic Development Plan.
Over the next two decades, Taiwan changed from an agricultural-based economy with an
over-supply of labor to an industrial-based economy.  The agricultural sector, which comprised
32.2 percent of GDP in 1952, accounted for only 12.7 percent in 1975, while industry's share
increased from 19.7 percent to 39.9 percent in the same period (Table 5).
In 1952, 56.1 percent of the population was employed in primary industry and only 16.9
percent in the industrial sector (Table 6).  By 1975, the labor force in the agricultural sector fell to
only 29.9 percent while industry rose to 35.4 percent.  This declining trend in agriculture and the
corresponding increased importance of industry continued through the 1970s and 1980s.  By
1995, the relative shares of employment were 10.6 percent in agriculture and 38.7 percent in 13
Table 5.  Share of Gross Domestic Product by Industries
Year Agriculture Industry Services
----------------- Percent -----------------
1952 32.2 19.7 48.1
1955 29.1 23.2 47.7
1960 28.5 26.9 44.6
1965 23.6 30.2 46.2
1970 15.5 36.8 47.7
1975 12.7 39.9 47.4
1980 7.7 45.7 46.6
1985 5.8 46.3 47.9
1990 4.2 41.2 54.6
1995 3.5 36.3 60.2
Table 6.  Share of Employment by Industries
Year Agriculture Industry Services
---------------------- Percent ----------------------
1952 56.1 16.9 27.0
1955 53.6 18.0 28.4
1960 50.2 20.5 29.3
1965 46.5 22.3 31.2
1970 36.7 27.9 35.4
1975 29.9 35.4 34.7
1980 19.5 42.4 38.1
1985 17.5 41.6 41.0
1990 12.9 40.8 46.3
1995 10.6 38.7 50.7
1996 10.1 37.5 52.414
industry.  The industrial sector has become the mainstay of Taiwan's economy.  The foundation
and conditions for this economic transformation from an agrarian to an industrialized economy
were essentially complete by the early 1970s.
6. Food Policy in Transition 
Between 1946 and 1948, price inflation in Taiwan was about five-fold and it jumped to about
thirty-fold in early 1949.  In the meantime, two million soldiers and civilians were added to the
population.  The need for price stabilization was extremely urgent and led to the New Taiwan
Dollar Reform in the middle of 1949.  The old currency was devalued by a factor of 40,000, and a
conservative full-reserve system was established. 
To fight inflation, a high-interest policy was adopted with the introduction of "preferential
interest savings deposits."  At the very beginning, these deposits carried an interest rate of as
much as 7 percent per month, equivalent to 125 percent per annum.  This high rate was lowered
as prices came down.  In the nine years during which these deposits were accepted, they proved
very effective in absorbing an enormous amount of idle capital, thus contributing greatly to price
stabilization.  The high interest rate policy not only promoted savings but also helped direct
investment toward more efficient enterprises. 
On the fiscal side, the government made determined efforts to curtail public expenditures and
increase tax revenue.  The timely arrival of U.S. economic aid in 1951 greatly facilitated the task
of post-war rehabilitation and fiscal management.  Aid-financed imports in the 15 years before
Taiwan was graduated in 1965 accounted for about 30 percent of total imports.  Equally
important, local currency generated by the sale of U.S. aid-financed commodity imports not only15
reduced inflationary pressures but also helped offset government budget deficits until the budget
was balanced in the early 1960s.
In the meantime, substantial imports of U.S. aid-financed commodities and increases in
domestic production, especially food production, helped relieve pressures on demand.  Such
increases in farm output were due primarily to institutional innovations; those in industrial output
were due largely to investments in relatively simple manufacturing operations with support from
the U.S. aid program. 
As a result of these anti-inflationary policies and measures, prices were gradually brought
under control.  Between 1952 and 1960, the annual increase in the level of prices fell to an
average of 8.8 percent, and decreased to only about 3 percent in 1961.  While success in the fight
against runaway inflation took about a decade, it laid a healthy foundation for sustained rapid
growth in the years that followed. 
The role of rice as a wage good had a particularly important influence on government policy. 
In many instances, rice was used to hedge against inflation and, often, financial transactions were
made in terms of, or in relation to, rice.  Under these conditions, fluctuations in the price of rice
were considered to have an adverse influence on the price of other commodities and services.  It
was argued that a rise in rice prices would raise labor costs, thereby raising the cost of production
of labor-intensive industries.  Increases in the cost of producing industrial goods, in turn, would
affect their competitive position in international markets, and the pace of industrialization would
slow.  Consequently, stabilizing the general price level meant maintaining rice prices at relatively
low levels.16
During the first two decades of postwar agricultural development, government policies were
quite successful in achieving both greater rice production and greater control over rice marketing
for the purpose of maintaining a stable rice price.  The government had purposely collected large
rice stocks.  Before 1973, the major means of accumulating rice stocks included paddy land taxes
in kind, compulsory purchases of paddy from the paddy landowners, rent on government-owned
farmland, proceeds in kind from the sale of public farmland, barter of fertilizers for rice, sales
proceeds collected from ex-tenants who received land under the land reform program, and
repayment of rice production loans provided by the government.  Under the slogan of "more food
for the people and the military," government policies toward rice were not seriously challenged
(Chen, Hsu and Mao, 1975).
Rice prices in Taiwan have been very stable except in 1953, 1960 and 1974 when they
experienced sharp upsurges because of bad weather and short supplies.  In addition, the price
spread between producers' prices and consumers' prices has been narrow.  Seasonal price
variations in normal years were small.  To a large extent, this price stability resulted from
government participation in rice marketing and strict application of government regulations in the
rice market.  The stabilization of the rice price served as a basis for overall price stabilization that
facilitated the development of labor-intensive industry in the period from 1950 to 1970.
III.  Difficulties in the Future Agricultural Development in Taiwan
By the mid-1960s, industrial production overtook agriculture in both percentage
contributions to net domestic product and as a major source of exports.  Concurrently, the role of
agriculture in development marked a turning point from a major supporting role to a sustaining
role.  The slowdown in the growth rate of agricultural production became evident by the end of17
the 1960s.  Moreover, the agricultural product mix changed in response to market opportunities. 
For example, the mix adjusted toward more production of livestock and fishery products and
high-value export crops.  This change in structure presented Taiwan's agriculture with new
problems similar to those existing in some other industrial countries at a comparable development
stage.
With rapid expansion in industrial employment, the farm operations faced rising labor and
production costs.  Consequently, the gap between farm and nonfarm per capita income widened
during the 1960s (Table 7).  To raise farm income, government has carried out a series of 
Table 7.  Per Capita Farm and Nonfarm Family Income
Year Farmers Nonfarm
Farm Family Income As
a Percent of Non-Family
Income 
-------- NT$ --------
1966   4,509 6,464 69.8
1970  5,350 8,894 60.2
1975 14,274 21,285 67.1
1980 37,891 55,560 68.2
1985 54,558 79,031 69.0
1990 98,004 142,569 68.7
1995 172,206 227,637 75.6
measures since 1970.  The ratio of per capita farm to nonfarm family income increased from 60.2
percent in 1970 to 75.6 percent in 1995.  The relatively low income in agriculture has become a
major issue in policy making.  Unbalanced growth between the agricultural and nonagricultural18
sectors affects the production, prices and wages of the agricultural sector with impacts on the
economy as a whole.
The greatest challenges facing contemporary agricultural development in Taiwan include: 
1. Rigid Farmland System
After the implementation of land reforms in Taiwan, the land tenure system became
very rigid.  Many part-time farmers left their land to overseers and would not lease it to
other farmers because they feared that the government might revoke the land reform
regulations and force them to give up their land ownership.  Consequently, it has become
extremely difficult for full-time farmers to enlarge their farm size by renting additional
farmland.  A system originally designed to prevent land concentration unwittingly
prevented more productive use of land which constitutes a serious bottle-neck to further
agricultural development.  
Since 1960, group farming has been encouraged by the government to promote the
efficiency of small farms.  Farm mechanization has also been encouraged with group
farming to realize economies of scale and to solve the labor shortage problem.  Thus,
small landowners were encouraged to turn over cultivation of their small pieces of
farmland to full-time large farmers.  Through group cultivation, no change in land
ownership was needed and small farmland owners were free to seek full-time jobs.  
The Council of Agriculture is drafting a new law which will provide more flexibility in
farmland transactions and the tenancy system.  Under the existing land laws, only bona
fide farmers are qualified to purchase farmland.  The proposed new law will allow
agricultural school graduates, young men and women who have received special training19
in farming, agribusiness, and agricultural production cooperatives to buy farmland.  The
new law will free all tenancy contracts except those signed under the 37.5 percent Rent
Reduction Act.  In addition, the proposed new law will put more restrictions on the
conversion of farmland to nonagricultural uses after a comprehensive land use plan is
drawn.  The new law is expected to prevent land speculation in rural areas and to enlarge
the farm size for improving farm efficiency. 
2. Pollution
Rural industrialization has contributed positively in Taiwan by providing employment. 
However, the industrial sector has become the major source of pollution in the rural areas
and has adversely affected agricultural production.  The most serious problem is water
pollution.  All rivers and streams in western Taiwan have become polluted by industrial
wastes in various degrees.  Factories also took advantage of irrigation and drainage
canals in the rural areas to discharge the industrial waste water without treatment.  In a
few cases, industrial wastes have resulted in soil contamination so bad that surrounding
farmland had to be abandoned.  People in the rural areas have become more and more
concerned about the deterioration of the rural environment.  They have refused to
tolerate any pollution from rural industries and farms, which created strong pressure on
the government to take pollution control measures in the rural area. 
In many cases, agriculture is responsible for deteriorating rural environmental
conditions in Taiwan.  For example, over-use of fertilizers and chemicals has polluted the
surface as well as the ground water in the rural areas.  The wastes discharged from the
livestock farms have caused the water and air pollution.  Ground water over-use for20
irrigation by agriculture has resulted in serious land subsidence in the southern coast area
of Taiwan.  To solve these problems, the government has taken regulatory actions.  For
instance, the agricultural farms have been encouraged to raise brackish water fish instead
of fresh water ones.  Livestock farms are not allowed to discharge the animal wastes
without treatment.  With these measures, the rural environment is expected to stop
deteriorating and gradually improve.
3. Rapid Changes in Food Demand Structure
As the per capita income in Taiwan increased, food consumption patterns changed
significantly.  Farmers in Taiwan are facing two big challenges, i.e., to adjust production
to the changing demand and to compete with foreign agricultural producers both in the
domestic and foreign market.  Sharp increases in labor costs, combined with these rapid
switches in demand and competition, have created great pressure on Taiwan's farmers. 
Many of them have been unwilling to adjust and have lost interest and confidence in
agriculture.
It would be an unprecedented achievement if Taiwan could create a dual structure
consisting of a small number of internationally competitive full-time farmers and a rural
majority of part-time farmers holding their land while staying in the villages with the bulk
of their income from nonfarm occupations.  Hence, the agricultural policy in the future
should focus on improving the management, production practices, income and welfare of
full-time farmers.  The small part-time farmers have the options of either maintaining their
small-scale farm by subsidies from off-farm income or of discontinuing farming.  It is
important to note that the new agricultural system needs firm and strong support from the21
government to maintain its competitiveness while performing in an environmentally
friendly manner.
4.  Small Scale Farm Operation and Low Farmers' Income 
Despite its inefficiency and low labor returns, the small farm system is likely to continue even
though there is limited cultivated land and a high population density.  Taiwan's average farm size
was 1.12 hectares in 1955, decreased to 0.79 hectare in 1980, and increased gradually to 0.83
hectares in 1995 due to a decrease in the number of farm households.  In the early days, small
farms could be competitive because labor-intensive farming manifested no significant scale
economies.  Now the situation has changed.  Machines have been substituted for manual work in
order to overcome farm labor shortages.  As a result, a one-hectare farm is too small to be
operated efficiently.  In the process, land use has become less intensive. The multiple cropping
index dropped from its peak of 190 in 1964 to 114 in 1996.  This indicates a switch toward an
extensive use of farmland and calls for actions to encourage better use of the limited land
resources. 
Until the mid-1960s, agriculture was able to generate a steady increase in real income to farm
families at a level that was commensurate with that of nonfarm families.  Since then, net farm
income has risen relatively slowly.  In 1970, the per capita income of farm families was down to
60 percent of that of nonfarm families.  Per capita farm family income recovered steadily to 76
percent in 1995 due to various supportive policies implemented by government.
Low income from farming has made farmers look for other income sources.  Many farmers
have chosen nonfarm, part-time work.  In 1966, 66 percent of farm family incomes came from
agriculture and 34 percent was nonfarm income, but these proportions have been reversed since22
1981.  The low returns from agriculture have resulted in the sluggish growth of the agriculture
sector. 
5.  Falling Competitiveness in the World Market
Largely because of the surge of wage rates and, hence, the costs of farm production, many
farm products have become unprofitable.  For example, imported corn has replaced sweet
potatoes as the major foodstuff and forced many farmers to give up growing sweet potatoes. 
Rice and sugar are no longer profitable for export.  Once hot export items, canned mushrooms,
asparagus and pineapple have lost their world market shares to other countries.
6.  Policy Adjustments
In order to cope with structural change in agriculture and to ensure a sound and balanced
development of the economy, a new agricultural development policy entitled "The Guidelines of
Agricultural Policy" was announced in November 1969.  The policy was designed primarily to
accelerate agricultural modernization and to maintain a balance between the agricultural sector
and the rest of the economy.  The policy set forth 14 guidelines for gradual implementation step-
by-step.  A number of action programs have since been developed, including:  (1) reduction in the
price of fertilizer in 1970 and in 1971, (2) establishment of an Agricultural Finance Coordinating
Committee in June 1970, (3) improvement of the agricultural marketing system in 1970, (4)
promotion of the farm mechanization program in 1970, and (5) reduction in the farmers' tax
burden in 1971. 
For the purposes of accelerating rural and agricultural development and improving the
welfare of farm families, the Accelerated Rural Development Program (ARDP) was announced in
1972.  The set of new policy measures included:  (1) abolishing the rice-fertilizer barter system,23
(2) abolishing the educational surtax on farmland, (3) easing agricultural credit terms, (4)
improving agricultural marketing, (5) strengthening rural infrastructure, (6) accelerating the
adoption of integrated use of improved cultivating techniques, (7) establishing specialized
agricultural production areas, (8) strengthening agricultural research and extension and (9)
encouraging the establishment of industrial parks in rural areas.
The ARDP was designed to increase agricultural production, raise farm income, improve
rural environment and accelerate agricultural modernization.  The government appropriated a
total of NT$ 2 billion in the next two years to carry out all nine measures listed above.  This
program marked the change of economic development policy from "squeezing" agriculture to
supporting agriculture.  The program was originally scheduled to be concluded at the end of
1974.  However, in view of the need for more efforts to lay a solid foundation for modernizing the
agricultural sector, the government decided to extend the program to 1978.
In 1973 and 1974 when world food shortage became intensified and there was also a
shortage of rice in Taiwan, the government made self-sufficiency in rice a national policy.  To
increase rice production and to improve farmers’ income, the government adopted the guaranteed
rice price policy, a sharp switch from the previous one.  The Food Stabilization Fund was
established simultaneously with the guaranteed rice price.  This policy was expected to halt the
decline of rice production and to narrow the disparity between the income of farmers and
nonfarmers.  In principle, the floor support price was fixed with a 20 percent profit margin above
the production costs.  Under this favorable condition, rice production reached a record 2.7 million
metric tons in 1976.  From 1974 to 1977, the government set no limit on the quantity purchased
from rice growers.  Due to the large outlays resulting from this policy, the government has limited24
the quantity purchased to 970 kilograms per hectare per crop since 1977.  The government also
participated in the market operations by buying rice in order to maintain a politically acceptable
price.  The guaranteed price of paddy rice of NT$10 per kilogram in 1974 was increased to
NT$11.5 per kilogram from 1975 to 1978, to NT$12.5 per kilogram in 1979, to NT$18.8 per
kilogram in 1982-1988.  Since 1989, the rice price has been maintained at NT$19 per kilogram. 
The rise in the price support was inconsistent with what was happening on the demand side of the
market.  That is, while the government provided increased incentives for production, per capita
consumption of rice declined from 140 kilograms per year in 1968 to 128 kilograms in 1976, 105
kilograms in 1980, and 66 kilograms in 1990, and 59 kilograms in 1995.
As expected, rice surpluses became a serious problem for the government.  In the late 1970s,
the government carried out an extension education program to shift paddy fields into production
of other crops, livestock and poultry.  There was no economic incentive attached to the program. 
With continuing declines in consumption, the rice surplus problem became even more serious.  In
reaction, in 1984, a Six-Year Rice Production and Paddy Field Diversion Program was
implemented which gave a direct subsidy of one metric ton of paddy rice per hectare to farmers
who shifted their paddy fields to corn, sorghum or soybeans.  In addition, corn, sorghum and
soybeans were purchased by the government at a relatively high guaranteed price.  If farmers
changed from rice to the production of crops other than corn, sorghum and soybeans, the subsidy
increased to 1.5 metric tons of paddy rice per hectare.  
Many farmers participated in the diversion program and the production of rice decreased
significantly year after year.  In 1995, rice production was 1.7 million metric tons -- a big
reduction compared to 2.7 million metric tons in 1976.  To make the program more beneficial to25
farmers and reduce the management costs, the payment-in-kind subsidy was changed to the cash
payment in 1988.  At that time, the cash payment price for paddy rice was set at NT$16.5 per
kilogram.  Thus, a total payment of NT$16,500 and NT$24,750 per hectare was made to farmers
to replace one metric ton of paddy rice and 1.5 metric tons of paddy rice, respectively.  Since
1988, the cash payment price for paddy rice has changed many times and it is now NT$18 per
kilogram.
Starting in 1989, the quantity of rice the government is committed to purchase at the
guaranteed price increased to 1,400 kilograms per hectare and the quantity purchased at a price
that is higher than the market price was set at 1,000 kilograms per hectare.  Obviously, the
purpose of the policy is to give more income to rice growers.  
In the 23 years since the establishment of the Food Stabilization Fund (1974-June 1997), the
fund has lost a total of NT$102 billion in buying and selling rice.  The current rice policy has
suffered from a basic policy inconsistency -- the program of shifting from rice to other enterprises
is aimed at reducing rice production on the one hand, while the guaranteed rice price provides
incentives to produce more rice.  The government understands the contradiction of these policy
measures, yet is reluctant to abolish the guaranteed rice price immediately as a means of
protecting farmers’ economic and political interests.  Discontinuing the guaranteed rice price
policy would hurt farmers' economic interests, which would become a political problem and may
result in a social instability.  However, continuing these policies will be an increasing government
financial burden and make the rice surplus problem persist.  Now, a direct payment scheme linked
to farmers' income and the land use is under consideration as a substitute for the current
guaranteed rice price policy.  26
In 1979, the government launched a subsequent program called the Program on Enhancing
Farm Income and Strengthening Rural Reconstruction which was, in essence, a continuation of
the Accelerated Rural Development Program.  In 1980, the government initiated a Program on
Basic Infrastructure Development.  Then, in 1982, these two programs were merged into the
Program on Strengthening Basic Infrastructure and Enhancing Farm Income.  This program
coordinated and integrated long-term rural development projects.  
In 1985, a six-year Program on Improving Agricultural Structure and Enhancing Farm
Income was launched.  This program places emphasis on:  (1) adjustment of crop production to
reduce rice production while increasing high-value crops, (2) enlargement of the scale of farming
operations, (3) improvement of agricultural marketing, and (4) strengthening agricultural research
and extension.  From 1991 to 1997, the government proposed an Integrated Agricultural
Adjustment Program, the goals of which were to take care of farmer welfare, develop agriculture,
and develop infrastructure in rural areas.  In 1997, an Across Century Agricultural Development
Program was initiated.  The goals of this program include:
# Continued development of modern agriculture,
# Building rich and beautiful rural areas, and
# Raising and strengthening the welfare of farmers.
From 1989 to 1998, a total of NT$487.7 billion was spent on these programs.  For a small
country, public capital investment and expenditure of this magnitude to vitalize the small farm
economy during a period of 10 years is impressive.  By 1995, Taiwan had 872,000 hectares of
cultivated land, 779,000 farm families and a 3,716,000 farm population.  This means that the
average amount of public investment and expenditure on the farm economy over the past 10 years27
was NT$559,289 per hectare of cultivated land, NT$626,059 per farm family and NT$131,243
per capita for the farm population.  
Public expenditures on the agricultural sector will continue to grow as the national economy
expands.  The supply of capital for investment in agriculture will not be a serious problem as the
enlarging industrial and service sectors enhance the ability to support agriculture.  The question
will be how to best use public investments so that new technology can be introduced and diffused
quickly, the scale of farming enlarged, and the efficiency of agricultural production improved. 
These are the challenges for the people and the government in Taiwan.  
IV. Agricultural Development in China
In China, since 1978, the decentralization of decision-making -- combined with appeals to
develop commodity production -- encouraged specialization and generated large increases in
agricultural output and income.  Over the past two decades, agriculture has made important
contributions to the development of the national economy in terms of products, markets, labor
force, capital and foreign exchange.  The position of agriculture in national economic
development can be analyzed as follows:  
1. Position and role of agriculture in economic development
Since 1978, China has achieved a steady increase in agricultural production.  From
1978 to 1985, the average annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) was 9.4
percent (Table 8) and agriculture 10.1 percent.  Agriculture’s value added totaled 1,428.5
billion yuan.  The contribution made by the growth of agriculture to real GDP growth in
this period reached 4.3 percent with the value of agricultural output accounting for 42.328










- - - - - - - - - - - - Percent - - - - - - - - - - - -
1978-1985 9.4 10.1 3.98 5.42
1986-1990 4.3 5.5 2.23 2.07
1991-1995 12.0 10.1 3.64 8.36
percent of total economic activity.  The nonagriculture sector’s growth rate was 5.8
percent, accounting for 57.7 percent of economic activity.  
Between 1986 and 1990, the average annual growth rate of the gross domestic
product was 4.3 percent, and agriculture 5.5 percent.  The real agricultural value added
totaled 733.9 billion yuan.  The contribution made by the growth of agricultural to real
GDP growth in this period reached 2.2 percent, with the value of agricultural output
accounting for 51.8 percent.  The nonagricultural sector grew by 2.1 percent with total
output accounting for 48.2 percent of the economic activity.  From 1991 to 1995, the
average annual growth rate of the domestic product was 12.0 percent, and agriculture
was 10.1 percent.  Agriculture’s value added totaled 1,895.1 billion yuan.  The
contribution made by the growth of agricultural to real GDP growth in this period was
3.6 percent, with agricultural output accounting for 30.3 percent of the economic
activity.  The nonagriculture sector amounted to 8.4 percent and accounted for 69.7
percent of economic activity.  The steady increase in agriculture laid a foundation for the
growth of the national economy as a whole.29
Since 1978, agriculture has made a steadily increasing contribution to China’s
economic growth.  From 1978 to 1985, agricultural growth made a bigger contribution
than in 1986-90 and 1991-95 (2.2 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively).  Although the
growth of the national economy between 1991 and 1995 remained at a high level, the
contribution of agricultural value added indicated a declining trend.  Judging from the
long-term development trend, agriculture’s share of the gross domestic product will
continue to decline.  In the future, China will need to continue to encourage the
appropriate scale of farm operations in places having good growing conditions to
improve agricultural productivity and to coordinate the development of industry and
agriculture.
2. Coordinating in industry and agriculture
Industry and agriculture are the two primary sectors of the national economy engaged
in material production.  Whether these sectors develop proportionally has a direct impact
on the sustained and stable growth of the national economy.  International experience and
past practice of the country indicates the desirability of proportionate growth of industry
and agriculture in both physical and value terms.
In the seven years from 1978-1985, the policy of "readjustment, reform consolidation
and improvement" led to more rapid growth of agriculture than industry.  This was a
marked change from the situation under which industry had for so long developed too
fast while agriculture had grown too slowly.  From 1986-1990, the development of
agriculture declined as large quantities of resources were transferred to urban industry
and rural nonfarming sectors.  Growth in production of grain, cotton and oil-bearing30
crops declined, resulting in a proportionate gap of industrial and agricultural
development.  Between 1986 and 1990, the average annual industrial growth rate was 8.4
percent, while that of agriculture decreased from 10.1 percent to 5.5 percent Table 9).  In
1988, under the dual pressure of rapid industrial development and the tight supply of
major agricultural products, inflationary pressures developed.  
Table 9.  Average Annual Growth Rate
/1 in Industrial and Agricultural Sector
Year Period Agriculture Industry
Proportion
(Agriculture as 1)
- - - - - - - - - - - - Percent - - - - - - - - - - - -
1978-1985 10.1 8.3 1 : 0.82
1986-1990 5.5 8.4 1 : 1.53
1991-1995 10.1 18.1 1 : 1.79
/1The annual growth rate is calculated using the total value.
To correct the uncoordinated development of industry and agriculture and control the
existing inflation, China started a new round of three-year economic readjustment in the
fourth quarter of 1988.  The result was the stimulation of both agricultural and industrial
growth, although the latter advanced much more rapidly.  During 1991 to 1995, the
average annual industrial growth rate increased from 8.4 percent to 18.1 percent, while
that of agriculture increased from 5.5 to 10.1 percent (Table 9).  The ratio of growth of
agriculture to industry deteriorated to 1:1.79.  This suggests that China could become
more import-dependent as its consumers respond to higher incomes with increased
demand for higher valued and resource-using foods such as chicken and pork.  This, in
turn, suggests reduced growth in rice consumption.31
3. Rural Reform and Development
China’s rural reform and its cycles of agricultural development can be divided into
four stages:
1) Establishment of farmer households as the main operators and the
unconventional growth of agriculture (1979-1984).
The most successful dimension of rural reform has been the development of family
farmers as the major production unit.  In the short span from 1979 to 1984, China
transitioned from contracting output to households to contracting the whole
production process to households.  By the end of 1984, farm households became the
basic units of agricultural production and the base of the rural economy.
To enable the farmers to get better prices for their products, in 1979, China raised
the prices of major agricultural produce and sideline products.  Meanwhile, China
reduced the scope and quantity of agricultural produce subject to mandatory
purchase.
During this period, agricultural production grew rapidly, which not only solved the
problem of insufficient food and clothing for most farmers but also created an
environment for further reform.  In the process, the purchasing and marketing system
was improved and provided a solid foundation for economic reforms in cities. 
2)  Reform of purchasing quotas for agricultural products (1985-1988). 
Agricultural products experienced a low-level structural surplus in 1985. 
Subsidies to grain, oil-bearing crops and other bulk agricultural products imposed a
large financial burden on the Chinese government, second only to the losses incurred32
by state-owned industrial enterprises.  Thus, China decided to abolish the system of
quotas for purchasing agricultural products and imposed a dual-track system of
purchasing grain, oil-bearing crops and other bulk agricultural products by signing
contracts and purchasing through the market.  All other agricultural products were
traded on the open market with production adjustments being determined by market
forces.
To lessen the financial burdens, China relaxed the controls over the prices of
agricultural capital goods and gradually reduced subsidies to industries serving
agricultural production.  In response, the prices of agricultural capital goods rose
sharply, resulting in a cost-price squeeze for crop farmers.  As a result, the
production of grain, cotton and other bulk products stagnated and animal husbandry,
fisheries and township enterprises experienced a boom period.  The result was rapid
adjustment in the rural economic structure.
3) Readjustment of the national economy (1989-1991)
Starting in 1988, China corrected its national economic policy to control inflation
through a tightening of macroeconomic policies.  Although agricultural production
grew, the government purchase prices for grain and cotton were far lower than the
market prices.  As a result, it was difficult for all places to purchase grain and cotton
as planned.  In reaction, China’s government monopolized its rice policy at the end of
1988.  In 1990, the system of contract purchasing was changed into direct purchasing
by the state.  However, cotton purchasing and marketing continued to be
monopolized by rural supply and marketing cooperatives.  The development of33
nonagricultural activities was curtailed.  The development of township enterprises
slowed down markedly.  As a result, the income of farmers began to decline for the
first time since the introduction of reforms.  The income and consumption gaps
between urban and rural areas retrenched to the level that existed before the reforms
started in 1978.
During this period, the rural reform was mainly characterized by local
breakthroughs in the grain purchasing and marketing system.  Grain marketing firms
began to introduce the market-oriented grain purchase and market system by
reducing the amount of grain purchased by the government (the contracted purchase),
reducing the amount of grain sold (at state-pegged prices), raising the prices of grain
both for contracted purchase and for marketing, and lifting controls over grain
purchases and market prices.  This led to the introduction of the system of purchasing
and marketing grain at the same price. 
4) Development of a market-oriented agricultural economy (1992-1997)
In this period, a series of reform measures were initiated which included creating
the floor price for grain, building standardized central and regional grain wholesale
markets, establishing grain reserves and implementing the “grain bag” and “vegetable
basket” projects.  The macroeconomy also was marching toward a market system. 
The agriculture and rural property right system was also reformed in that the term of
land contracting was extended by another 30 years and a turnover mechanism for land
use rights was established for the first time in history.  External investment in
agribusiness and agricultural production and food processing grew very fast during34
this period.  The result was diversified development of the agriculture sector and rural
economy, including expanded grain and vegetable production capacity and the
development of township enterprises.  Agriculture and the rural economy supported
rapid development of the national economy. 
The following conclusions can be drawn from this analysis:
# The income gaps between urban and rural areas continued to widen.  This suggests that
the allocation of national income was biased toward cities. 
# Though policies and measures produced by the state were quite strong, their
implementation left much to be desired.  While the reforms touched deep in the problems
of agriculture and the rural economy, traditional interest structures were very hard to
change.
V. Difficulties in China’s Future Agricultural Development
The objective of China’s reform program, initially, was to build the basic framework for a
socialist market.  This has been accomplished by reforming the property right system,
macroeconomic system, and the urban and country governmental system.  It also created an
agricultural and rural economic system with the market being a major means for allocating
resources with effective guidance, support, protection and control by the state.  However, China
is sure to meet many difficulties in increasing the output and income of farmers because of its less
efficient production technology, small scale of production and the traditional interests in rural
areas.  The major difficulties can be described as follows:
# Its quantity of available farmland decreases as population increases.  35
# Its system for developing and extending advanced and adaptable technologies is not
sound. 
# Its supply of agricultural inputs cannot be ensured.
# Its excess supply of rural labor must find alternative employment.
# Its small scale production makes it impossible, in the near-term, to achieve economies of
size for grain production.
Overcoming these difficulties requires that China approach its agricultural policies from a
long-term perspective with well-defined concepts and goals, and that it seek new policy paths and
methods.
VI. Conclusions
Over the years, Taiwan’s agriculture has experimented with various adjustments in farm
management to cope with fierce competition from other sectors for land, labor and other
resources while minimizing the adverse effects of farmland fragmentation and small-scale farming. 
Improvements have been introduced in the scale of farming, farm mechanization, farm
organization, infrastructure development and farmer training.  The result has enhanced farm
income and improved living conditions for farmers.  In addition, Taiwan introduced a series of
agriculture policies to balance the growth of agricultural and industrial sectors. 
Despite increased market orientation, China’s government seems to have entered a phase of
uncertainty regarding what should be done about prices, markets, investments and control of land
utilization.  The core of these problems lies with the farm households that are typical of China’s
agriculture.  Small, inefficient farms reduce the rate of private investment in agriculture.  Increases36
in farm product purchase (support) prices after 1978 were designed to foster increased production
and to generate increased investment by peasants in their farm operations.  
China’s agricultural markets have gradually changed to a unified purchasing and marketing
system where prices are more responsive to forces of supply and demand.  However, agricultural
development has lagged relative to that of the industrial sector.  Industrial and agricultural
development still keep a high level.  To reduce this gap, China has introduced many policies and
programs.  However, because of system rigidities, its performance lags that of other agricultural
economies in the region.
In contrast, Taiwan's longer-term approach to developing its small farm economy is a well-
known success story.  It started in the early 1950s with a peaceful land reform which was
followed by improvement in farm resource utilization, building rural infrastructure, provision of
agricultural extension services and introduction of production structure changes.  This approach
can be characterized by close cooperation between the government and farmers, strong linkages
between the farm and nonfarm sectors, and effective coordination between planning and financing. 
Taiwan’s policies have become a development model attracting global interest.  Its experiences
with agricultural development and policy implementation should be of great value to China and to
other small farm economies.     
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